Switzerland’s e-voting system has predictable implementation blunder
October 6, 2023 by Andrew Appel
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Last year, I published a 5-part series about Switzerland’s e-voting system. Like any internet voting system, it has inherent security vulnerabilities: if there are malicious insiders, they can corrupt the vote count; and if thousands of voters’ computers are hacked by malware, the malware can change votes as they are transmitted. Switzerland “solves” the problem of malicious insiders in their printing office by officially declaring that they won’t consider that threat model in their cybersecurity assessment.
But the Swiss Post e-voting system (that Switzerland uses) addresses the malware-in-voter-computer problem in an interesting way that’s worth taking seriously. Each voter is sent a piece of paper with some special “return codes” that are never seen by the voter’s computer, so any potential malware can’t learn them. And each voter is instructed to follow a certain protocol, checking the return codes shown on their screen against the return codes on the paper.
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This demonstrates that Gooferment can’t run “voting”.
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